Parliament control over the executive through the budgetary process in Tanzania

This dissertation is about parliamentary control over the executive in Tanzania. One of the assumptions of the Democratic theory is that an elected government is democratic and accountable to the people. The government of Tanzania is said to be democratic and accountable to the people since it is elected. This study examines the extent to which the government is really accountable to the people through the Parliament. The effectiveness of parliamentary control over the Executive in the budgetary process is used to examine the extent to which the Tanzanian government is accountable to the people and the validity of the assumption of Democratic theory. The central thrust of the study is that government accountability is more than a function of elections alone. To a larger extent it depends on the political system under which these elections are conducted. Furthermore government accountability is enhanced where parliament has the organizational and technical capacity to effectively control the government, particularly in budgetary matters. In the case of Tanzania, the study has revealed that the government is least accountable to parliament for two main reasons. Firstly, various constitutional changes have altered the power relations between state organs. The Party is now supreme over all state organs and the Executive has extensive control powers over the Parliament. Secondly, the Parliament is faced with organizational and technical constraints which. Inhibit its effective control over the government. In view of the above the study concludes that in the case of Tanzania there is no automatic correlation between elections and accountable government as Democratic theory assumes. Although the Government is indeed elected its accountability to the people has been dubious.Furthermore the Parliament lacks the constitutional, organizational and technical capacity for effective control over the government on budgetary matters.