Parliamentary budgetary control in Tanzania

dc.contributor.authorKassimu, Hadija
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-26T08:41:38Z
dc.date.available2020-03-26T08:41:38Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.descriptionAvailable in print form, East Africana Collection, Dr. Wilbert Chagula Library, Class mark (THS EAF HJ2180.9.T34K37)en_US
dc.description.abstractThis study focused on Parliamentary Budgetary control in Tanzania. It is designed to examine the extent to which the government is really accountable to parliament. In this study, the budgetary process was used to examine the extent to which government is accountable to the people through their representatives, the applicability of the Doctrine of Separation Powers; and the Principle of Checks and Balances in Tanzania. The study employed various techniques for data collection. It involved interviews and questionnaires. The study revealed that, the application of the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of checks and balance in Tanzania is blurred. While the constitution has placed the supervisory and legislative powers in the parliament, however, it is has no power with regards to legislation over money bills. Parliament can neither make any changes on the budget proposal; nor can it reject it as a whole for fear of dissolution, since rejection is equated as a vote of no confidence. Basing on the data which was collected for this study, the study makes one major conclusion. The assumption that the adoption of multiparty politics would have strengthened parliament’s role in holding the government accountable by promoting the doctrine of separation of powers and principle of checks and balances in Tanzania needs to be revisited. Despite the fact it is now more than 15 years after the re-introduction of multipartism in Tanzania. The executive to a greater extent is vested with enormous powers and was very evidently from the study that parliament was, in fact, still subordinated by the government. The parliament in Tanzania is unable to exercise control over the government in the budgetary process. The study recommends that major constitutional changes be made to reduce the powers of the executives through the President. Particularly the study proposes for repeal of Article 99 of the constitution, which prohibits parliament and its committees from making any changes in the government’s proposals. In strengthening the practices of the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances in Tanzania, the study recommends for repeal of Article 55(4), which requires the President to appoint ministers and regional commissioners from within the parliament. Equally, changes are also suggested to Article 66(1), which allows the President to appoint regional commissioners from among parliamentarians. Such changes will reduce government’s influence in the parliament.en_US
dc.identifier.citationKassimu, H (2010) Parliamentary budgetary control in Tanzania, Master dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://41.86.178.5:8080/xmlui/handle/123456789/8183
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Dar es Salaamen_US
dc.subjectParliamentaryen_US
dc.subjectBudgetaryen_US
dc.titleParliamentary budgetary control in Tanzaniaen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
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