Assessing performance accountability by executive agencies to the public in Tanzania

Despite the increased visibility of executive agencies in Tanzania, the Key question about their accountability to the public remains unanswered. To fill the gap, the study assessed the extent to which agency autonomy has affected performance accountability of two agencies, namely the National Housing and Building Research Agency (NHBRA) and Tanzania foods and Drugs Agency (TFDA), to the Government and the public. Data was collected through documentary analysis, a small survey of agencies’ customers, and interviews with agency managers and staff, as well as officials of the Ministries of Lands and Health. This study established that the process of “agencification” has increased autonomy of the two agencies but it has not contributed to enhanced agencies’ responsiveness to their customers. Instead, “agencification” has weakened ministerial control over the agencies, attributable to faulty framework stipulated in the Executive Agencies Act of 1997 and little interest shown by the ministries to monitor the agencies effectively, which also has not been reinforced by customers’ (or Public’s) willingness and ability to make the agencies responsive. The overall low levels of performance accountability have been influenced by weak accountability framework, commitment of agency leadership to make their organizations responsive, and customers’ dispositions towards exerting pressures for the agencies to perform. It is recommended that incentives for agency performance and disincentives for Ministries’ disinterest in effective monitoring need to be devised; Parliament should play a more active role in oversight of the agencies, and public disclosure of information on agency performance should be made obligatory to all agencies.